Everything published, most recent first. Two a week: a standalone piece, and a reflection on that week's conversation.
333 essays
Boards keep hiring the executive who says yes. An entire market—search, remuneration, coaching, consulting—now manufactures the corporate saviour and has no mechanism for telling the truth about what he can deliver. Part one of two on the fraud that begins at appointment.
Part IV of a IV part series. The organisations capturing real value from AI are not better at AI; they are better at running organisations. The specific moves boards and executives can make to join them—and why nine years of evidence says most will not.
Part III of a IV part series: thirty-four per cent of organisations claim to be deeply transforming with AI. Eighty-four per cent admit no jobs have been redesigned. These two findings cannot both be true in any operationally meaningful sense. One of them is theatre.
A double issue. April and May kept returning to one move: swapping something legible—a competency grid, a diagnosis, a silver-bullet hire, a perpetual pilot—for the harder work of judgement. The task is always to weigh the particular case, not reach for the proxy that spares the weighing.
Part II of a IV part series: twenty-five per cent of organisations have moved AI experiments into production after nine years of trying. Fifty-four per cent expect to within three to six months—a prediction that has appeared in every major survey for nearly a decade.
Part I of a IV part series: for nine years surveys have produced a remarkably similar finding: a small minority of organisations capture real financial value from AI; the great majority spend, signal, and pilot.
The disruption industry treats breaking things as proof of seriousness. Edmund Burke—reformer, not reactionary—offered a corrective two centuries ago: most transformation programmes destroy more than they build. The best leaders renovate, not demolish.
When the board itself becomes the obstacle to clear thinking, no governance code can save the company. On groupthink, pluralistic ignorance, and the difference between directors who serve the company and those who merely sit on its board.
Every organisation has one. Twelve boxes, each promising to reduce leadership to something measurable and trainable. The framework is everywhere—and it is wrong in a more fundamental sense than you might think.
Most directors believe they want candour from their CEO. Most CEOs believe they provide it. Both are usually wrong. What Thucydides understood about Pericles, and what the research on boardroom silence confirms, explains why the gap between what is said and what is true keeps widening.
Organisations say they hire the best people. Too often, they hire the best proxies—credentials, categories, diagnoses—and never assess the person sitting in front of them. The filing system is satisfied. The organisation is not.
Organisations keep buying $200 hammers and handing them to people who have never built anything more demanding than a flat-pack bookshelf. The problem is never the quality of the hire. It is the quality of the context into which the hire is placed.
Boards are not designed to choose between oversight and collaboration—they are designed to hold both in productive tension. Polarity mapping offers directors a discipline for governing without drifting.
March’s essays converge on a simple truth: leadership is less about solving problems than managing enduring tensions. From strategy to governance, the task is not to choose sides, but to exercise judgement—resisting the drift toward process, theatre, and easy answers.
Control and empowerment are often performed rather than designed. In this piece I examine how organisations drift into theatre—adding process or slogans instead of clarity—and argue for bounded empowerment: clear guardrails, explicit decision rights, and real autonomy within limits.